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In December 2016, the New York City Police Department (NYPD) 
began using a new predictive policing tool called “Patternizr” to assist 
investigators in recognizing potential crime patterns.1  The algorithm, 
built on past crime data, is currently used to spot patterns of 
robberies, burglaries, and grand larcenies that may have been 
committed by the same person or group of people.2  The NYPD 
shared news of this development in February 2019 with the 
publication of an academic article by Patternizr’s developers, Alex 
Chohlas-Wood, former Director of Analytics at the NYPD, and Evan 
Levine, Assistant Commissioner of Data Analytics at the NYPD.3  
Despite acknowledging the “growing concern that predictive policing 
tools may perpetuate disparate impact,” Chohlas-Wood and Levine 
explain how they designed Patternizr to minimize bias.4  They claim 
to have accomplished this goal by blinding the models to “sensitive 
suspect information” including race and gender, as well as “ke[eping] 
potential proxy variables for sensitive information — particularly 
location — extremely coarse” in order to avoid correlation of crime 
 
 1. Alex Chohlas-Wood & E. S. Levine, A Recommendation Engine to Aid in 
Identifying Crime Patterns, 49 INFORMS J. ON APPLIED ANALYTICS 154 (2019). 
 2. Brian Holak, NYPD’s Patternizr Crime Analysis Tool Raises AI Bias 
Concerns, SEARCHBUSINESSANALYTICS.COM (Mar. 14, 2019), 
https://searchbusinessanalytics.techtarget.com/news/252459511/NYPDs-Patternizr-
crime-analysis-tool-raises-AI-bias-concerns [https://perma.cc/B6KA-HD29] (quoting 
NYPD spokesperson Devora Kaye). 
 3. Chohlas-Wood & Levine, supra note 1. 
 4. Id. at 160. 
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patterns with “sensitive attributes.”5  They asserted that “Patternizr is 
a new, effective, and fair recommendation engine . . . [that] when used 
properly, encourage[s] precision policing approaches instead of 
widespread, heavy-handed enforcement techniques.”6  This Article 
considers whether the developers’ goal to build a bias-free predictive 
policing tool is actually achievable given the limitations of its inputs 
— racially-biased historic criminal justice data — and its users — 
humans with the potential for errors and cognitive biases. 
This Article further considers the problems that may arise as a 
result of the NYPD’s use of Patternizr and attempts to evaluate 
whether it is a “fair,” unbiased tool, as the NYPD and Patternizr 
developers claimed.  Moreover, this Article seeks to further evaluate 
that claim based on the information disclosed in the Chohlas-Wood 
and Levine paper.  This Article identifies specific areas where more 
information and independent review is needed to fully interrogate 
this claim. 
In order to evaluate Patternizr, Part I reviews the extensive 
literature on the use of algorithms in the criminal legal system and 
then draws from these insights to evaluate potential issues raised by 
Patternizr. This Part also provides a brief background on predictive 
policing, tracking its evolution from computer-generated “heat maps” 
to increasingly sophisticated predictive models.  Following this 
background, Part I provides an overview of racial justice and civil 
liberties issues raised by predictive policing in general. 
Part II focuses on Patternizr, first providing background on its 
development and the capabilities of the software.  Part II then 
considers whether and how Patternizr could be used in ways that run 
afoul of the rights of those accused of crimes, specifically looking at 
issues of potential for error and due process concerns, racial bias, and 
Fourth Amendment rights. 
Part III provides recommendations for advocates to help curb the 
potential harms from this new predictive policing tool.  It considers 
potential policy solutions, ranging from an outright ban of predictive 
policing algorithms to regulations that would increase transparency 
and accountability in the use of predictive policing.  Further, Part III 
recommends methods for criminal defense attorneys to seek 
 
 5. Id. Chohlas-Wood and Levine give the example of race as a “sensitive suspect 
attribute.” Id. at 157. They characterize characteristics such as height, weight, force 
used, and number of suspects as “nonsensitive.” Id. at 158. 
 6. Id. at 163. 
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disclosure of the use of Patternizr in criminal cases under New York’s 
new discovery statute, set to go into effect in January 2020. 
The Article does not focus on Patternizr’s potential efficacy of 
reducing crime or identifying individuals suspected of committing 
crimes.  As such, traditional crime-solving efficacy measures are not 
used to evaluate the algorithm.  Instead, this Article focuses on how 
the NYPD’s use of Patternizr raises serious civil rights and liberties 
issues for those accused of crimes and how tools such as Patternizer 
contribute to racially-biased mass incarceration and mass surveillance 
of New York’s communities of color. 
I. BACKGROUND ON PREDICTIVE POLICING 
Predictive policing is an umbrella term that encompasses “the 
application of analytical techniques . . . to identify likely targets for 
police intervention and prevent crime or solve past crime” by making 
statistical predictions.7  It is “based on directed, information-based 
patrol; rapid response supported by fact-based prepositioning of 
assets; and proactive, intelligence-based tactics, strategy, and policy.”8  
Its proponents argue that predictive policing can revolutionize 
policing, help cash-strapped departments do more with less, and 
drastically increase public safety.9  Its critics, including academics and 
leading criminal justice reform advocacy groups, caution that 
“[p]redictive policing tools threaten to provide a misleading and 
undeserved imprimatur of impartiality for an institution that 
desperately needs fundamental change.”10  The following Section 
traces a brief history of predictive policing followed by racial justice 
and civil liberties concerns raised by the use of algorithms in the 
criminal legal system. 
 
 7. Id. at 154 (quoting WALTER L. PERRY ET AL., PREDICTIVE POLICING: THE 
ROLE OF CRIME FORECASTING IN LAW ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS 1–2 (RAND 
Corp. 2013)). 
 8. Charlie Beck & Colleen McCue, Predictive Policing: What Can We Learn 
from Wal-Mart and Amazon about Fighting Crime in a Recession?, POLICE CHIEF 
MAG. (Mar. 13, 2014), http://www.policechiefmagazine.org/predictive-policing-what-
can-we-learn-from-wal-mart-and-amazon-about-fighting-crime-in-a-recession/ 
[https://perma.cc/D52N-3U36]. 
 9. Id. 
 10. AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION & 16 CIVIL RIGHTS PRIVACY, RACIAL 
JUSTICE & TECH. ORGS., PREDICTIVE POLICING TODAY: A SHARED STATEMENT OF 
CIVIL RIGHTS CONCERNS (2016) [hereinafter ACLU & 16 CIVIL RIGHTS ORGS.], 
https://www.aclu.org/other/statement-concern-about-predictive-policing-aclu-and-16-
civil-rights-privacy-racial-justice [https://perma.cc/A459-SZ7Z]. 
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A. A Short History of Predictive Policing 
Professor Andrew G. Ferguson divides predictive policing 
technology into three distinct generations.11  First, police departments 
developed algorithms to predict the locations of property crimes.12  
Second, this evolved into a focus on predicting the locations of violent 
crimes, including robberies, shootings, and gang-related violence.13  
The most recent evolution, noted by Ferguson, is a shift to predictive 
policing tools that can forecast specific individuals who are predicted 
to be involved in crimes either as perpetrators or victims.14  Professor 
Ferguson cautions that each generation of predictive policing tools 
“may be based on historical data with statistically significant 
correlations, but the analyses and civil liberties concerns differ.”15  
Although his generation model does not include a category into 
which Patternizr can easily be characterized, as Patternizr neither 
predicts locations nor people who may be involved with future crimes, 
Ferguson’s approach of differentiating the various generations of 
predictive policing tools and evaluating each for specific concerns 
raised is important.  For example, the concerns raised regarding 
place-based policing programs differ from a new pattern-based tool 
like Patternizr.  However, it is important to understand concerns 
about predictive policing more broadly in order to effectively analyze 
this new generation of tools. 
Ferguson and others note that the NYPD has long sought to 
increase policing efficiency through the use of data and technology.16  
In 1994, the NYPD developed Compstat — computer comparison 
statistics — to “compile information on crimes, victims, times of day 
crimes took place, and other details that enable precinct officials to 
spot emerging crime patterns.”17  Following New York City’s lead, 
other cities implemented various data-driven systems to better 
allocate policing resources, often using a form of hotspot policing 
 
 11. Andrew G. Ferguson, Policing Predictive Policing, 94 WASH. U. L. REV. 1109, 
1112–13, 1114, 1136 (2017) [hereinafter Ferguson, Policing Predictive Policing]. 
 12. Id. at 1144. 
 13. Id. at 1126–37. 
 14. Id. at 1137–43. 
 15. Id. at 1114. 
 16. Id. at 1124; Harvard Gov’t Innovators Network, Compstat: A Crime 
Reduction Management Tool, INNOVATIONS IN AM. GOV. AWARDS (1996), 
https://www.innovations.harvard.edu/compstat-crime-reduction-management-tool 
[https://perma.cc/PLX9-ARLE]. 
 17. Harvard Gov’t Innovators Network, supra note 16. 
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where analysts plotted crime reports on a map and sent officers to the 
areas where crime was most concentrated.18 
Taking hotspot policing to the next level beyond Compstat, the Los 
Angeles Police Department (LAPD) collaborated with academics to 
develop an algorithm to predict likely areas where property crimes 
would occur.19  Starting in 2010, the LAPD used these predictions to 
deploy officers to specific areas where crimes were anticipated in the 
hopes of having a deterrent effect.20  In an influential article directed 
at policing insiders, the LAPD Chief of Detectives and collaborating 
data scientist urged the law enforcement community to adopt lessons 
from business analytics and touted the success of the LAPD’s early 
experiments with predictive policing.21 
As advances in predictive policing gained national attention, the 
academics who developed the algorithm that predicted areas where 
crime was likely to occur formed PredPol, Inc., a company that sells 
predictive policing software to law enforcement agencies across the 
country.22  The early experiments in using algorithms to predict and 
deter crime morphed into “a multi-million dollar business, and large-
scale marketing campaign to sell predictive policing programs.”23  
Other companies, such as Palantir, HunchLabs, and IBM, also sell 
technologies similar to PredPol’s software to help police departments 
identify crime trends and forecast locations and offenders of future 
crimes.24  Now that predictive policing is a profitable industry, 
developers of new predictive policing technologies may have financial 
incentives to trumpet claims of efficacy and fairness while competing 
for lucrative government contracts.  As will be discussed later in this 
Article, these incentives raise the stakes for governing bodies and the 
public to seek outside audits of predictive policing tools and not 
simply take the assertions of fairness and efficacy from developers at 
face value.25 
 
 18. Ferguson, Policing Predictive Policing, supra note 11, at 1126. 
 19. Id. at 1126–27. 
 20. Mark Puente, LAPD Pioneered Predicting Crime with Data. Many Police 
Don’t Think It Works, L.A. TIMES (July 3, 2019), 
https://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-lapd-precision-policing-data-20190703-
story.html [https://perma.cc/YT75-PB8W]; Ferguson, Policing Predictive Policing, 
supra note 11, at 1126–30. 
 21. Beck & McCue, supra note 8. 
 22. Ferguson, Policing Predictive Policing, supra note 11, at 1131. 
 23. Id. at 1132. 
 24. See Kristian Lum & William Isaac, To Predict and Serve?, SIGNIFICANCE 15, 
16 (2016). 
 25. See infra Section III.B.i. 
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B. Critiques of Predictive Policing and “Actuarial Justice” 
With the rise of the use of data and algorithms in many areas of 
criminal procedure — including risk assessments for bail 
determinations, sentencing, and parole determinations26 in addition 
to predictive policing tools27 — researchers and reform advocates 
alike have raised concerns about the transparency and fairness of the 
algorithms upon which the criminal legal system increasingly relies.  
These concerns center on issues of racial bias, automation and 
confirmation bias, Fourth Amendment issues, data accuracy and due 
process concerns, and democratic oversight of the use of these new 
policing tools.  This Section briefly outlines each of these concerns 
and gathers insights from commentators and advocates about 
suggested steps to evaluate predictive policing tools. 
i. Racial Biases 
The potential for racial biases to be built into algorithms used in 
the criminal legal system has been the focus of much concern and 
research by social scientists, legal scholars, and advocates.  
Researchers point out that algorithms are prone to reproduce racial 
biases in the data sets on which the algorithms are trained, even when 
the data does not explicitly include race as a factor.28  One reason is 
that police databases provide an incomplete and unrepresentative 
picture of all crimes, likely due to implicit and explicit racial bias 
informing areas where police patrol and who they stop, search, and 
arrest.29   Professor Barry Friedman explains this dynamic: 
Algorithms don’t have to look at race to be racist.  Whether written 
by humans or a product of machine learning, algorithms take past 
facts and magnify them into future police actions.  They rely heavily 
on criminal records.  Much of street policing in recent years — stop 
and frisk, marijuana enforcement, catching fare-beaters — has been 
deployed disproportionately against minorities and in poor 
neighborhoods.  Police may ‘go where the crime is,’ but because so 
 
 26. See Julia Angwin et al., Machine Bias, PROPUBLICA (May 23, 2016), 
https://www.propublica.org/article/machine-bias-risk-assessments-in-criminal-
sentencing [https://perma.cc/G5DN-7QGQ]. 
 27. See infra Section II.A. 
 28. See, e.g., Lum & Isaac, supra note 24, at 17–18 (PredPol “has been described 
by its founders as a parsimonious race-neutral system that uses ‘only three data 
points in making predictions: past type of crime, place of crime and time of crime. It 
uses no personal information about individuals or groups of individuals, eliminating 
any personal liberties and profiling concerns.’”); see also Angwin et al., supra note 
26. 
 29. Lum & Isaac, supra note 24, at 15–16. 
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much focus has been on low-level offenses in disadvantaged areas 
that are ignored elsewhere, these algorithms make it inevitable that 
the police will return to these places time and again.30 
Additionally, no one is immune from implicit bias.  In addition to 
officers’ biases, community members who report crimes also influence 
historic crime data with bias.31  As a result of biases held by officers 
and those reporting crimes, predictive policing algorithms are built 
with an incomplete and biased understanding of where crimes are 
taking place and who is committing them. 
In two recent studies of different algorithms — NorthPointe’s 
COMPAS risk assessment tool and PredPol’s location-based 
predictive policing algorithm — social scientists found evidence of 
racially disparate impacts despite both software programs’ claims that 
the algorithms do not use race as a factor.32  In ProPublica’s report on 
COMPAS, researchers reported that the algorithm-based tool for 
assessing risk of reoffending for pretrial release, sentencing, and 
parole decisions accurately predicted recidivism in the total pool 61% 
of the time, but that “[B]lack [people] [were] almost twice as likely as 
whites to be labeled a higher risk but not actually re-offend.”33  The 
researchers also found that the assessment tool made “the opposite 
mistake among whites” in that white people were more likely to be 
labeled lower risk but go on to commit other crimes.34  The report 
explains that COMPAS’s developers found it “difficult to construct a 
score that doesn’t include items that can be correlated with race — 
such as poverty, joblessness, and social marginalization” and that 
omissions of such data reduces the accuracy of the predictions.35 
Another algorithm — PredPol — is unable to correct the flaws in 
the data produced as a result of racial bias.  In a study published in 
2016, Human Rights Data Analysis Group Lead Statistician Kristian 
 
 30. Barry Friedman, The Worrisome Future of Policing Technology, N.Y. TIMES 
(June 22, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/22/opinion/the-worrisome-future-
of-policing-technology.html [https://perma.cc/5FG6-53JS]. 
 31. Angwin et al., supra note 26; see also Jessica Gillooly, Opinion, Want to Stop 




 32. Lum & Isaac, supra note 24; see also CATHY O’NEIL, WEAPONS OF MATH 
DESTRUCTION: HOW BIG DATA INCREASES INEQUALITY AND THREATENS 
DEMOCRACY 86 (2016) (“Jeffrey Brantingham, the UCLA anthropology professor 
who founded PredPol, stressed to me that the model is blind to race and ethnicity.”). 
 33. Angwin et al., supra note 26. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
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Lum and PhD candidate William Isaac compared PredPol 
recommendations on enforcement areas, which were based on 
historic drug crime data, with public health data on drug use in 
Oakland, California.36  They built a synthetic population of Oakland 
and mapped for drug use based on public health data, finding that 
“[v]ariations in our estimated numbers of drug users are driven 
primarily by differences in population density, as the estimated rate of 
drug use is relatively uniform across the city.”37  However, the police-
recorded data for drug crimes paints a very different picture, with 
arrests focused in “two areas with largely non-white and low-income 
populations.”38  To show the impact of using this police-recorded data 
on the operation of a predictive policing model, Lum and Isaac 
applied a publicly available PredPol algorithm to the Oakland Police 
Department data on drug crimes, finding that the model flagged areas 
“already over-represented in the historical policing data” (compared 
to their drug use density map) for targeted enforcement.39  Since 
PredPol cannot correct for racial bias, the resulting data only 
intensifies that bias.  Thus, the researchers concluded that the 
algorithm reinforced racial biases in the original police data rather 
than correct for such bias.40 
Criminal law reform advocates echo similar concerns.  Ezekiel 
Edwards, Director of the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) 
Criminal Law Reform Project, summarized the impact of racial biases 
throughout the criminal system: 
If there is one reliable prediction about our criminal justice system, 
it is that unwarranted racial disparities infect every stage of the 
criminal law process.  Time and again, analysis of stops, frisks, 
searches, arrests, pretrial detentions, convictions, and sentencing 
reveal differential treatment of people of color.  From racial bias in 
stops and frisks in New York, Boston, and Baltimore, to 
unwarranted disparities nationwide in arrests of Black[] and white[] 
[people] for marijuana possession (despite comparable usage rates), 
to disparities in the enforcement of minor offenses in Minneapolis, 
New Jersey, and Florida, as sure as the sun rises police will continue 
to enforce laws selectively against communities of color.41 
 
 36. Lum & Isaac, supra note 24, at 16–17. 
 37. Id. at 17. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. at 17–18. 
 40. Id. at 19. 
 41. Ezekiel Edwards, Predictive Policing Software Is More Accurate at Predicting 
Policing Than Predicting Crime, AM. C.L. UNION: SPEAK FREELY (Aug. 31, 2016), 
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Echoing similar concerns regarding the use of criminal justice data 
to build predictive tools, Vincent Southerland, Executive Director of 
the Center on Race, Inequality, and the Law at New York University 
School of Law, cautions that 
[A]ny system that relies on criminal justice data must contend with 
the vestiges of slavery, de jure and de facto segregation, racial 
discrimination, biased policing, and explicit and implicit bias, which 
are part and parcel of the criminal justice system.  Otherwise, these 
automated tools will simply exacerbate, reproduce, and calcify the 
biases they are meant to correct.42 
While developers of predictive policing technologies may attempt 
to control for racial biases in their algorithms by removing race-
specific data, legal scholars, social scientists, and advocates remain 
skeptical that race-blind algorithms will reduce racial biases in 
policing.43  Instead, they warn that the use of these algorithms will 
compound existing biases in the criminal legal system.44 
ii. Unchecked Error: Data, Social Science, and Cognitive Biases 
Commentators have also raised concerns that the use of algorithms 
may introduce hard-to-identify errors into the investigative process.  
Such problems can originate with simple data entry errors,45 larger 
scale problems of flawed and untested social science theories 
informing the creation of the models,46 and errors stemming from 
automation and confirmation biases.  When left unchecked, these 





 42. Vincent Southerland, With AI and Criminal Justice, the Devil Is in the Data, 
AM. C.L. UNION (Apr. 9, 2018), https://www.aclu.org/issues/privacy-
technology/surveillance-technologies/ai-and-criminal-justice-devil-data 
[https://perma.cc/D9C9-LAJ6]. 
 43. See infra Section I.B.i. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Ferguson, Policing Predictive Policing, supra note 11, at 1145–50. 
 46. Id. at 1161–64 (“Social science, not simply technology, underlies the promise 
of predictive policing.”); see also O’NEIL, supra note 32, at 87–88. 
 47. See infra Section I.B.ii for a discussion of ways that unchecked errors may 
lead to wrongful arrests, prosecutions, and convictions. 
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1. Data Entry Errors 
Predictive policing algorithms are built on data sets and respond to 
new data that are collected and entered by humans.48  Data entry 
errors can occur during collection, input, and management of the 
data.49  Professor Ferguson notes that examples of the data entry 
error may include that of an officer mistakenly writing down the 
wrong address of a crime scene (a collection error), transposing a 
number or misspelling a name when entering notes into a computer 
(an input error), and the accidental creation of duplicate entries or 
deletion of entries when the data is integrated into a database (data 
management errors).50  Such errors — especially when compounded 
with other sources of human error discussed in the following Sections 
— can lead to flawed predictions and unjust results.51 
2. Flawed Social Science 
Cathy O’Neil, author of Weapons of Math Destruction, cites 
“broken windows policing”52 and the use of PredPol to predict and 
patrol for nuisance level crimes as an example of how a questionable 
social science theory can lead to issues in the creation and 
deployment of predictive policing tools.53  Some researchers credit 
the impressive drop in violent crime in New York City to the rise of 
broken windows policing.54  On the other hand, other theories 
attribute the drop in crime to phenomena such as “the falling rates of 
 
 48. See, e.g., Ferguson, Policing Predictive Policing, supra note 11, at 1145. 
 49. Id. at 1145–46. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. O’NEIL, supra note 32, at 87. “Broken windows policing” refers to the theory 
advanced by public policy expert James Q. Wilson and criminologist George Kelling 
in the influential article, Broken Windows, that argued that disorder “leads to 
increased fear and withdrawal from residents, which then allows more serious crime 
to move in because of decreased levels of informal social control.” George L. Kelling 
& James Q. Wilson, Broken Windows: The Police and Neighborhood Safety, 
ATLANTIC (Mar. 1982), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1982/03/broken-windows/304465/ 
[https://perma.cc/E6CN-365K]. The theory of broken windows policing is that “[t]he 
police can play a key role in disrupting this process. If they focus in on disorder and 
less serious crime in neighborhoods that have not yet been overtaken by serious 
crime, they can . . . prevent serious crime from infiltrating.” Broken Windows 
Policing, GEORGE MASON UNIV., DEP’T CRIMINOLOGY, L., & SOC’Y, CTR. FOR 
EVIDENCE-BASED CRIME POL’Y, https://cebcp.org/evidence-based-policing/what-
works-in-policing/research-evidence-review/broken-windows-policing/ 
[https://perma.cc/M59Q-5RWP] (last visited Nov. 3, 2019). 
 53. O’NEIL, supra note 32, at 86–88. 
 54. Id. at 87–88. 
54 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XLVII 
crack cocaine addiction to the booming 1990s economy,” and to the 
legalization of abortion in the 1970s.55 
Despite competing theories explaining NYC’s drop in crime, police 
are “[r]aised on the orthodoxy of zero tolerance [and] have little more 
reason to doubt the link between small crimes and big ones than the 
correlation between smoke and fire.”56  As a result, this commitment 
to particular social science theories, such as broken windows policing, 
has informed the development and use of predictive policing tools 
including PredPol.  While these predictive policing tools have the 
appearance that they are “not only scientific but fair,” they also may 
magnify the biases inherent in the models’ underlying theories, such 
as the tendency of broken windows policing to over-police poverty.57 
3. Cognitive Biases 
Commentators caution that biases including automation bias — the 
tendency to believe a computer-generated report over that of a 
human-created report58 — and confirmation bias59 can distort the 
 
 55. Id. at 87–88; see also STEVEN D. LEVITT & STEPHEN J. DUBNER, Where Have 
All the Criminals Gone?, in FREAKONOMICS: A ROGUE ECONOMIST EXPLORES THE 
HIDDEN SIDE OF EVERYTHING 115, 121 (2005); Steven D. Levitt, Abortion and 
Crime: Who Should You Believe?, FREAKONOMICS BLOG (Mar. 15, 2005), 
http://freakonomics.com/2005/05/15/abortion-and-crime-who-should-you-believe/ 
[https://perma.cc/92N3-PEES]. 
 56. O’NEIL, supra note 32, at 89. 
 57. Id. at 91. 
PredPol, even with the best of intentions, empowers police departments to 
zero in on the poor, stopping more of them, arresting a portion of those, and 
sending a subgroup to prison. And the police chiefs, in many cases, if not 
most, think that they’re taking the only sensible route to combating 
crime . . . . The result is that we criminalize poverty, believing all the while 
that our tools are not only scientific but fair. 
Id. 
 58. See generally M.L. CUMMINGS, AMERICAN INST. OF AERONAUTICS AND 
ASTRONAUTICS, AUTOMATION BIAS IN INTELLIGENT TIME CRITICAL DESIGN 




 59. See, e.g., Margit E. Oswald & Stefan Grosjean, Confirmation Bias, in 
COGNITIVE ILLUSIONS: A HANDBOOK ON FALLACIES AND BIASES IN THINKING, 
JUDGEMENT AND MEMORY 79 (Rudiger F. Pohl ed., 2004); see also Erin Murphy, 
Databases, Doctrine, and Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 
803, 830 (2010) (“The true risk is a leaping-to-conclusions, or confirmation bias. It is 
the fear that the individual will be sucked into a morass of suspicion from which 
escape is arduous or impossible — Kafka’s The Trial, not Orwell’s Big Brother.”). 
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investigative process and make errors less likely to be checked than in 
a human-driven process.60  Professor M.L. Cummings cautions that: 
Automation bias occurs in decision-making because humans have a 
tendency to disregard or not search for contradictory information in 
light of a computer-generated solution that is accepted as correct 
and can be exacerbated in time critical domains.  Automated 
decision aids are designed to reduce human error but actually can 
cause new errors in the operation of a system if not designed with 
human cognitive limitations in mind.61 
Due to automation bias, officers may place undue confidence in 
automated recommendations, whether a PredPol recommended 
hotspot or an algorithm-generated list of individuals likely to be 
involved in crime.  Lindsey Barrett, author of Reasonably Suspicious 
Algorithms, explains this phenomenon, noting that: 
An algorithmic risk prediction seems like the automation of an 
officer weighing fact-specific circumstances, and determining the 
possibility of a crime occurring based on those facts.  But an 
algorithm’s determination of a high crime area or an individual’s 
threat level is qualitatively and quantitatively distinct from an 
officer’s judgment.  An automated assessment is the product of a 
greater volume of information, which furthermore may be riddled 
with unknown errors, bias, or both. While an officer may make a 
mistake in judgment — a possibility the preexisting standard 
acknowledges — courts can understand and contextualize human 
error.62 
As a result, automation bias presents the two-fold risk that 
computer-generated recommendations are trusted above human 
judgment while simultaneously concealing potential unchecked 
errors. 
Another bias with the potential to distort the investigative process 
is confirmation bias.  This is the process in which “information is 
searched for, interpreted, and remembered in such a way that it 
systematically impedes the possibility that the hypothesis could be 
rejected.”63 Put another way, confirmation bias in law enforcement 
occurs when “[officers] form an opinion, create a theory, and then 
 
 60. Ferguson, Policing Predictive Policing, supra note 11, at 1178; see Lindsey 
Barrett, Reasonably Suspicious Algorithms: Predictive Policing at the United States 
Border, 41 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 327, 348–49 (2017). 
 61. Cummings, supra note 58, at 1. 
 62. Barrett, supra note 60, at 348–49 
 63. Oswald & Grosjean, supra note 59, at 79. 
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work to prove it right instead of proving it wrong.”64  Confirmation 
bias may lead officers to confirm the recommendations of a predictive 
policing algorithm through their follow-up investigation.  Research 
has shown that confirmation bias affects people not only in motivated 
processes (where the person finds information to support a desired 
conclusion), but also in unmotivated processes (where the person has 
no interest in a particular conclusion) due to psychological 
phenomena such as the primacy effect, in which “information 
encountered early in the process is likely to carry more weight than 
that acquired later.”65  Early information gained by an officer — that 
an area is prone to crime or that a person is likely to be involved in 
crime — may influence the information they unintentionally seek out, 
process, and remember. 
Together, automation bias and confirmation bias have the potential 
to create feedback loops in which officers receive information from 
predictive policing software — information likely to be presumed 
accurate and bias free — that primes the officers to believe crime is 
afoot in certain areas or within certain lists of people.  By increasing 
vigilant patrol of the area or list, the officers are likely to find 
information — and make arrests — supporting the hypothesis. 
Human errors in data recording, entry, and processing will 
inevitably inform and be a byproduct of any predictive policing 
software.66  Professor Ferguson urges police departments to 
acknowledge this room for error, which he argues “does not discount 
the value of predictive policing technologies but only qualifies the 
findings and tempers the unquestioning acceptance of the 
information.”67  This step may help to reduce automation bias as well 
as “set the state for correcting error, auditing error, and training 
humans to prevent error.”68 
iii. Fourth Amendment Concerns 
Commentators also raise concerns regarding the impact of 
predictive policing tools on reasonable suspicion and probable cause 
determinations.  Under the Fourth Amendment, police need 
 
 64. Amaury Murgado, Dealing with Confirmation Bias, POLICE MAG. (July 17, 
2014), https://www.policemag.com/341175/dealing-with-confirmation-bias 
[https://perma.cc/ADW7-LXYH]. 
 65. Raymond S. Nickerson, Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous Phenomenon in 
Many Guises, 2 REV. GEN. PSYCHOL. 175, 187 (1998). 
 66. See infra Section I.B.ii. 
 67. Ferguson, Policing Predictive Policing, supra note 11, at 1151. 
 68. Id. 
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probable cause and a warrant (or one of any number of valid 
exceptions to the warrant requirement recognized by the Supreme 
Court) for a search,69 and they need reasonable suspicion for a Terry 
investigative stop.70  The Supreme Court defines probable cause as 
“more than bare suspicion: Probable cause exists where ‘the facts and 
circumstances within their (the officers’) knowledge and of which 
they had reasonably trustworthy information (are) sufficient in 
themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that’ 
an offense has been or is being committed.”71  In cases where an 
informant shares information, an officer has probable cause when she 
has reason to believe the tip based on a totality of the informant’s 
basis of knowledge (for example, the informant personally observed 
or participated in the criminal activity), their reliability (whether the 
officer knows the informant to be trustworthy), and the veracity of 
the tip, usually determined through independent police 
corroboration.72 
Such determinations inherently rely upon prediction and 
probabilities.  As Professor Ferguson points out, “determining what is 
‘reasonable’ or whether sufficient probable cause exists in a given 
 
 69. The Fourth Amendment states that:  
[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, 
and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized.  
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Supreme Court has carved out a number of exceptions 
to this requirement. See, e.g., Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298 (1967) (holding 
that the exigency exception to the warrant requirement applies when officers are in 
hot pursuit of a suspect or there is danger to the officer’s or others’ safety); United 
States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973) (holding that the search incident to 
lawful arrest exception to the warrant requirement applies to all arrests regardless of 
underlying rationale); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227, 248 (1973) 
(explaining that valid consent to a search waives the warrant and probable cause 
requirement); Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 132 (1990) (explaining the plain 
view exception to the warrant requirement); Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 
307 (1999) (extending the automobile exception to the warrant requirement to 
passenger’s belongings). 
 70. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968). 
 71. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175–76 (1949) (alterations in original) 
(quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925)). 
 72. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230–31 (1983) (clarifying that probable cause 
exists when the totality of the circumstances suggests that the tip is reliable, without 
requiring a rigid analysis of basis of knowledge, reliability, and veracity). 
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case involves a predictive judgement by a judge or law enforcement 
official.”73  Similarly, Barrett notes that: 
Prediction is already a part of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, 
explicitly and implicitly.  A search warrant might rely on the 
prediction, based on probable cause, that contraband will be found 
in a certain location . . . . Fourth Amendment analysis also 
frequently relies on anchoring broad probabilities to individual 
suspects, such as profiles, and high crime areas, or individualized 
predictions of possibly questionable reliability, such as reliance on 
informant tips.74 
Despite the reliance on prediction and probability in traditional 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, it is not clear how predictive 
policing technologies factor into reasonable suspicion and probable 
cause determinations.  In the realm of place-based predictive policing, 
magistrate judges will likely treat the prediction of areas for increased 
patrol as a “relevant characteristic[] of a location in determining 
whether the circumstances are sufficiently suspicious to warrant 
further investigation.”75  While the determination that an area is a 
“high crime area” or “hotspot” is not sufficient for a stop or search on 
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See, e.g., Transcript of Oral Argument at 5–6, Brennan Ctr. v. NYPD (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
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[https://perma.cc/K683-GGWM]. Law enforcement have gone to great lengths to 
conceal and avoid litigation on the constitutionality of new technologies, in some 
cases, officers have even refused to testify regarding the use of policing technologies 
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secrecy of police technology. See Brad Heath, Police Secretly Track Cellphones to 
Solve Routine Crimes, USA TODAY (Aug. 23, 2015), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2015/08/23/baltimore-police-stingray-cell-
surveillance/31994181/ [https://perma.cc/Q7FB-UUYY]. 
2019]  A BIAS-FREE PREDICTIVE POLICING TOOL? 59 
its own, Ferguson predicts that “with some relevant corroboration, a 
predictive tip will serve the basis of a constitutional stop.”76 
However, it is less clear how predictive policing tools will affect 
probable cause or reasonable suspicion analyses in scenarios where 
algorithms predict people likely to be involved in crime or link 
individual suspects to potential crime patterns.  Ultimately, using such 
information in probable cause determinations raises serious civil 
liberties concerns.  The ACLU and a coalition of sixteen additional 
civil rights organizations argue that: 
The Fourth Amendment forbids police from stopping someone 
without reasonable suspicion — a specific, individualized 
determination that is more than just a hunch.  Computer-driven 
hunches are no exception to this rule, and a computer’s judgment is 
never a further reason (beyond the articulable facts that intelligibly 
caused that judgment) for a stop, search, or arrest.  Similarly, 
predictive policing must not be allowed to erode rights of due 
process and equal protection.  Systems that manufacture 
unexplained “threat” assessments have no valid place in 
constitutional policing.77 
It is not yet clear to what extent predictive policing tools are being 
used for such determinations of reasonable suspicion and probable 
cause, but scholars and advocates alike raise concerns regarding the 
potential of predictive policing tools to reshape and further weaken 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.78 
II. PATTERNIZR: THE NYPD’S NEWEST PREDICTIVE TOOL 
A. Background on Patternizr 
Data scientists at the NYPD created Patternizr in order to assist 
crime analysts with identifying patterns of crimes that were 
committed by the same suspect or group of suspects.79  Prior to the 
development of Patternizr, NYPD analysts manually searched 
through computerized records of past crimes to try to identify 
patterns in criminal activity.  This manual process was time intensive 
and often limited to a small geographic focus, as crime analysts tend 
 
 76. Ferguson, Reasonable Suspicion, supra note 73, at 312. 
 77. ACLU & 16 CIVIL RIGHTS ORGS., supra note 10. 
 78. See, e.g., id.; Barrett, supra note 60, at 345, 346; Ferguson, Policing Predictive 
Policing, supra note 11, at 1169.. 
 79. Chohlas-Wood & Levine, supra note 1. 
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to focus on crimes that have occurred within their precincts.80  
Patternizr software allows investigators to pull up a crime report on 
any NYPD computer and, with the push of a button, “patternize” the 
seed crime.  The algorithm quickly returns a report listing ten 
potentially related crimes from the NYPD’s database.81  Each 
potentially related crime is scored between 0-1, representing the 
strength of the software’s recommendation on whether the crimes are 
related to the seed complaint.82  The investigator then manually 
reviews the potential matches and decides whether or not to group 
the crimes together in a pattern, reflecting a belief that the same 
suspect or group of suspects are responsible for the crimes in the 
pattern.83  If the investigator groups the crimes together, the crimes 
are then investigated as a pattern and information from one incident, 
such as a known suspect, would be used to further the investigation of 
the crimes within the pattern.84 
i. Examples of How Patternizr Works 
The NYPD’s most cited Patternizr success story is how the 
software helped them “crack[] the case of the needle-wielding 
shoplifter.”85  In that case, an analyst used Patternizr to identify 
similarities between two robberies in distant precincts where the 
accused person was shoplifting power drills from a hardware store, 
and upon being confronted, threatened — and on one of the 
occasions, attacked — an employee with a hypodermic needle.86  The 
analyst was able to combine these two robberies with near-identical 
fact patterns with two other larcenies they believed were committed 
 
 80. See Steven Melendez, NYPD Unveils Controversial algorithm to Track Crime 
Patterns, FASTCOMPANY (Mar. 20, 2019), 
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 81. Chohlas-Wood & Levine, supra note 1, at 161–62. 
 82. Id. at 159. 
 83. Id. at 162. 
 84. Id. at 154. 
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by the same suspect.87  The analyst then passed the information to an 
NYPD detective who investigated the crimes and ultimately arrested 
a suspect who later pleaded guilty to larceny and felony assault.88 
Chohlas-Wood and Levine also share the example of identifying a 
pattern of thefts of unattended watches and jewelry from gym lockers 
in Midtown Manhattan.  At the time of publication of their paper, the 
investigation was ongoing, though two suspects had been identified 
through video footage.89  This series of gym larcenies and the 
“needle-wielding shoplifter” case are, at the time of writing, the only 
two examples that the NYPD has shared with the public regarding 
Patternizr’s use in identifying patterns of crime. 
ii. Patternizr’s Design 
Patternizr’s developers were inspired by an initial test of a 
machine-learning program called “Series Finder” created by MIT 
researchers in partnership with the Cambridge Police Department.90  
In this initial proof-of-concept, MIT researchers created an algorithm 
that identified burglary patterns that had taken analysts months to 
identify manually, while also identifying patterns that the analysts had 
missed.91  With a team of data scientists, Chohlas-Wood and Levine 
were able to build the initial experiment into a city-wide program 
using the data of the country’s largest municipal police force.92 
 
 87. Id. The paper does not specify how these additional charges were matched to 
the pattern. 
 88. Id. The exact charges and underlying facts to which the accused pleaded guilty 
are not disclosed, nor is any of the underlying evidence that led to the suspect. As a 
result, it is impossible to make an independent assessment of the likelihood that the 
investigators “got it right.” It is critical to note that while a guilty plea amounts to 
legal guilt, it may be a strategic choice made by the defendant and not a reflection of 
factual guilt. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Tong Wang et al., Learning to Detect Patterns of Crime, in MACHINE 
LEARNING AND KNOWLEDGE DISCOVERY IN DATABASES 515, 516 (H. Blockeel et al. 
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civilian employees.”). 
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In their analytics-focused article, Chohlas-Wood and Levine 
provide an overview of how they built the models that recommend 
potentially related crimes to NYPD investigators.93  While the article 
was written for an audience well-versed in applied analytics, key 
takeaways for stakeholders who are not data scientists include a 
better understanding of the underlying assumptions and several key 
design choices that inform the software. 
While other iterations of predictive policing tools have focused on 
either places or people, Patternizr focuses on crimes, or, more 
specifically, on the modus operandi (M.O.) of those committing the 
crimes.94  Patternizr, like Series Finder, is based on the assumption 
that many crimes are committed by serial offenders.95  As defined by 
the MIT researchers behind Series Finder, “the M.O. is the set of 
habits that the offender follows, and is a type of motif used to 
characterize the pattern.”96  The underlying assumptions, as explained 
by developers of Series Finder, include: 
– Each M.O. is different.  Criminals are somewhat self-consistent in 
the way they commit crimes.  However, different criminals can have 
very different M.O.’s. Consider the problem of predicting 
housebreaks (break-ins): Some offenders operate during weekdays 
while the residents are at work; some operate stealthily at night, 
while the residents are sleeping.  Some offenders favor large 
apartment buildings, where they can break into multiple units in one 
day; others favor single-family houses, where they might be able to 
steal more valuable items.  Different combinations of crime 
attributes can be more important than others for characterizing 
different M.O.’s. 
– General commonalities in M.O. do exist.  Each pattern is different 
but, for instance, similarity in time and space are often important to 
any pattern and should generally by weighted highly.  Our method 
incorporates both general trends in M.O. and also pattern-specific 
trends. 
– Patterns can be dynamic.  Sometimes the M.O. shifts during a 
pattern.  For instance, a novice burglar might initially use bodily 
force to open a door. A s he gains experience, he might bring a tool 
with him to pry the door open.  Occasionally, offenders switch 
entirely from one neighborhood to another.  Methods that consider 
 
 93. Chohlas-Wood & Levine, supra note 1. 
 94. See Chohlas-Wood & Levine, supra note 1, at 154; Wang et al., supra note 90, 
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 96. Wang et al., supra note 90, at 516. 
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an M.O. as stationary would not naturally be able to capture these 
dynamics.97 
In order to build Patternizr, Chohlas-Wood and Levine focused on 
three types of property crimes — robbery, burglary, and grand 
larceny.  They selected these crimes because there is sufficient pattern 
data on these crimes, the NYPD considers them significantly serious 
to warrant police intervention, and the NYPD already dedicates a 
significant amount of investigative resources to more serious violent 
crimes.98  The developers isolated a list of 39 distinct attributes, 
including various measures of distance, date and time of occurrence, 
premise type and name, whether a weapon was used, the number of 
suspects, suspect height(s), suspect weight(s), property taken, 
unstructured text, and the complaint narrative.99  Chohlas-Wood and 
Levine then trained three models — one for each type of crime — on 
“approximately 10,000 patterns between 2006 and 2015” built from 
“manually identified official patterns” and “complaint records where 
the same individual was arrested for multiple crimes of the same type 
within a span of two days.”100 The models learned nuances in which 
crime factors may be related in patterns using a complex decision-tree 
based classification algorithm.101  Chohlas-Wood and Levine use the 
example that grand-larceny pickpocketing is likely to happen closer in 
space and time — for example, around a specific corner — than a 
grand larceny shoplifting pattern, which is more likely to be spread 
out across the city.102  As a result, the model would learn to weight 
distance more heavily in pickpocketing complaints than in shoplifting 
complaints.103 
Chohlas-Wood and Levine emphasize the choice to “intentionally 
design[] the algorithm to minimize disparate impact on any specific 
group” by making the algorithm “completely blind to sensitive 
information about potential suspects, including race and gender, 
which was not included as a similarity feature for the predictive 
model.”104  Additionally, they “kept potential proxy variables for 
sensitive information — particularly location — extremely coarse to 
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ensure correlation with sensitive attributes had a very low degree of 
certainty while retaining some very general information about 
location.”105  Finally, and according to the developers, “most 
important[ly], several levels of expert human review are still required 
to establish a pattern, minimizing the potential for a seemingly likely 
(but incorrect) recommendation to result in any enforcement 
action.”106  To test the fairness of the model, Chohlas-Wood and 
Levine looked at whether Patternizr recommended pairs of crimes 
with suspects of specific racial groups at a different rate than existing 
identified patterns or random pairings.107  Their findings show “no 
evidence that Patternizr recommends any suspect race at a higher rate 
than exists with random pairing.”108 
B. Is Patternizr “Fair”? 
While the NYPD and Patternizr’s developers tout its fairness and 
efficacy as a predictive policing tool, advocates and technology 
experts have raised concerns.  A recent TechTarget article on 
Patternizr cited concerns from Gartner Analyst Darin Stewart that: 
As Patternizr casts its net, individuals who fit a profile inferred by 
the system will be swept up.  At best, this will be an insult and an 
inconvenience.  At worst, innocent people will be incarcerated.  The 
community needs to decide if the benefit of a safer community 
overall is worth making that same community less safe for some of 
its members who have done nothing wrong.109 
Additionally, the New York Civil Liberties Union (NYCLU) 
cautioned that “[t]o ensure fairness the NYPD should be transparent 
about the technologies it deploys and allow independent researchers 
to audit these systems before they are tested on New Yorkers.”110  
From available reporting on Patternizr, it appears that no one outside 
of the NYPD’s in-house developers has independently assessed how 
Patternizr works and whether it unintentionally replicates the 
problems in other types of predictive policing.111 
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i. Patternizr and Racial Bias 
Chohlas-Wood and Levine assert that the software is “fair” 
because it leaves out “sensitive suspect attributes” such as race, 
gender, and precise location.112  However, Patternizr, like other forms 
of predictive policing, remains vulnerable to replicating and 
compounding the racial disparities of the data on which it was 
trained.113  As demonstrated in studies of both COMPAS and 
PredPol, which do not include racial data but still produce racially-
disparate results, simply leaving out racial data does not mean that 
the algorithm will not produce racially-disparate results.114 
As the makers of COMPAS conceded, algorithms that do not 
include race as a category can still produce racially disparate 
results.115  Patternizr’s attributes, specifically unstructured text and 
complaint narratives, could allow “sensitive attributes” such as race, 
gender, and socioeconomic status to enter the algorithm through 
coded language (for example, “dark complexion,” and “homeless”).  
Beyond ‘back-door’ methods of race entering the algorithms, it is 
likely that analysts check the suspect descriptions, including the race 
and gender of suspects, when manually checking Patternizr’s 
recommendations for a possible match to a seed complaint.  This is 
only logical; if a seed complaint describes the suspect as a 5’8”, 170-
pound white woman, the analyst can quickly eliminate any 
recommendations where the suspect is not a white woman, as 
Patternizr has already screened for height and weight similarities.  
This may have the inadvertent effect of making sensitive suspect 
attributes like race and sex more material in the investigator’s manual 
review process.  If the algorithm already suspects the crimes are a 
match, and the investigator can rule out other recommendations due 
to the suspect’s demographic information, an investigator might 
overvalue a match of race and sex, as it would confirm rather than 
reject the software’s recommendation.116  This design feature, 
intended to eliminate racial bias from Patternizr, could actually 
increase analysts’ reliance on racial data when matching crimes to a 
pattern. 
Matching race and sex with individual suspect descriptions is not 
inherently problematic.  In their review, an investigator would likely 
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ensure that a suspect matches all available data points, whether those 
data points include race, sex, height, facial features, or tattoos.117  
However, the confluence of automation bias, confirmation bias, and 
racial bias could lead investigators to rush to conclusions.118  Due to 
automation bias, analysts are likely to believe Patternizr’s 
recommendation is correct.119  Additionally, implicit and explicit 
racial biases may enter into the manual check of race and sex by the 
analyst at this stage. For example, an analyst who implicitly or 
explicitly believes that Black men are more likely to commit 
burglaries may be less likely to question a Patternizr recommendation 
of a Black man as a suspect for a burglary than a recommendation of 
a white woman for the same crime.  If the sex and race match — and 
this data conforms to the analyst’s notion of what is likely in the given 
scenario — the analyst may gain confidence in the recommendation 
and then seek out additional inculpatory information while failing to 
seek out or overlooking information that might be exculpatory for the 
suspect recommended by Patternizr.120 
In a test for racial impact, Patternizr’s developers determined that 
the software is no more likely to group patterns of crimes together by 
race of the suspect than crime analysts’ manual pattern matching or 
random matching.121  Chohlas-Wood and Levine do not include 
statistics on the racial makeup of the database of crimes on which 
they trained the models. It is likely that the NYPD crime database 
significantly overrepresents people of color, specifically Black and 
Latinx men, due to over-policing and biases in crime reporting.122  
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When Black and Latinx men are already disproportionately over-
represented in the suspect pool due to biased policing, they will be 
more likely to be recommended as matches to new crimes.  The racial 
bias works similarly as in Lum and Isaac’s study of PredPol, but 
instead of narrowing in on 500 square feet of a city for likely crime, 
Patternizr narrows in on a list of likely crime (and, in cases with leads, 
suspect) matches.123  The data populating the system are derived from 
policing and community-reporting, which are often rife with bias.124  
For this reason, advocates should be concerned that Patternizr will 
compound these biases as the software focuses its enforcement on the 
universe of previously-identified suspects. 
ii. Patternizr and the Potential for Unchecked Errors 
The use of Patternizr may lead to errors that are particularly 
challenging to detect, based on a series of data and human 
interpretation vulnerabilities.  These include the theoretical 
underpinnings informing the design of Patternizr, data accuracy 
vulnerabilities, and cognitive biases that may compound potential 
errors, including automation and confirmation biases.125  A mistaken 
pattern and string of events leading to the arrest and prosecution of 
the wrong person has dire consequences.  All too often, criminal 
defendants plead guilty to crimes they did not commit as a risk-
mitigation strategy.126  For those who do go to trial, there are still far 
too many cases where individuals are convicted but later determined 
not to be guilty.127  While the right to a fair trial should serve as a 
 
 123. See Lum & Isaac, supra note 24, at 15–16. 
 124. See supra note 122 and accompanying text. 
 125. See supra Section I.B. 
 126. See, e.g., NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS, THE TRIAL PENALTY: 
THE SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO TRIAL ON THE VERGE OF EXTINCTION AND HOW 
TO SAVE IT 6 (2018), 
https://www.nacdl.org/Document/TrialPenaltySixthAmendmentRighttoTrialNearExt
inct [https://perma.cc/GT24-8M5V]. 
The virtual elimination of the option of taking a case to trial has so 
thoroughly tipped the scales of justice against the accused that the danger of 
government overreach is ever present. And on a human level, for the 
defense attorney there is no more heart-wrenching task than explaining to a 
client who very likely may be innocent that they must seriously consider 
pleading guilty or risk the utter devastation of the remainder of their life 
with incalculable impacts on family. 
Id. 
 127. See, e.g., DNA Exonerations in the United States, INNOCENCE PROJECT, 
https://www.innocenceproject.org/dna-exonerations-in-the-united-states/ 
[https://perma.cc/9HKF-59F3] (last visited Nov. 3, 2019). 
68 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XLVII 
bulwark against wrongful prosecutions, this aspiration is simply not 
the reality of the criminal legal system.128  As such, it is critical that 
developers and departments using Patternizr or similar predictive 
policing tools critically evaluate and seek to remedy the potential for 
unchecked error. 
Patternizr is built upon the criminological theories that many 
crimes are committed by serial offenders and that these offenders 
have habits or M.O.s that can be detected as crime patterns.129  
Chohlas-Wood and Levine discuss the many choices that they made 
while designing Patternizr, but they rarely explain why they made 
these choices and the theories informing these choices.130  More 
transparency on these design choices and theories would allow 
observers to point out its inevitable blind spots. 
Just as it is important to evaluate the underlying theories informing 
the algorithm, it is also important to consider what theories did not 
inform Patternizr’s design.  For example, analysts might consider the 
research on juveniles in the criminal legal system that shows that most 
juveniles “age out” of crime.131  However, a juvenile’s prior acts 
committed during a distinct phase might lead Patternizr to identify 
them as a suspect of similar crimes for years after they are likely to 
have matured and ceased committing crimes.132  Similarly, analysts 
might consider whether a case received media attention to better 
determine whether a similar crime was likely committed by the same 
suspect or a copycat.133 
Regardless of the underlying criminological theories informing 
Patternizr, predictive policing tools are based on theories and 
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assumptions made by humans.134 Those acting on Patternizr’s 
recommendations should not lose sight of the human choices — 
including potential blind spots and flaws — that inform its 
recommendations.  While these serious issues raise questions as to 
whether such predictive tools should be used at all, investigators and 
officers who use Patternizr should, at the very least, be trained on the 
limitations and potential errors of Patternizr. 
Patternizr may introduce error into the pattern-analysis process 
because of issues in data recording and entry.135  This could be the 
result of errors in the original data set on which the model was 
trained, where an error as simple as a mistyped word could skew the 
algorithm’s understanding of the factors creating a pattern.136  Errors 
in the seed complaint could also lead to false positives.  For example, 
if an officer writes that a shoplifter threatened an employee with a 
needle, this case might match the much-talked about hypodermic 
needle-wielding shoplifter of power drills.  However, the story sounds 
very different if additional details are recorded, such as that the 
shoplifter threatened the employee with a knitting needle and walked 
off with several bundles of yarn at a craft store.  Or, take for example 
if the word drill is mistyped ‘drinl.’  Did the shoplifter take a power 
drill or a soft drink?  Will Patternizr match this seed complaint to a 
series of larcenies at hardware stores or low-level drink and snack 
thefts from neighborhood corner stores? 
Patternizr’s developers emphasize that multiple levels of expert 
review are still needed to establish a pattern — mitigating the risk 
that a seemingly likely, but false, recommendation results in police 
action.137  Debra Piehl, the NYPD’s senior crime analyst, assured 
reporters that “it still allows the analysts that work for me to apply 
their own thinking and analysis.  The science doesn’t overwhelm the 
art.”138  While crime analysts will hopefully be able to catch errors in 
many circumstances, Patternizr could make such error-detection 
harder based on cognitive biases in favor of automated 
information.139  Patternizr, like other algorithms, is vulnerable to 
errors arising from data quality control issues,140 flawed assumptions 
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informing the design of the models,141 and cognitive biases that lead 
people to believe computers and to seek information confirming an 
early hypothesis.142 
Patternizr may make investigators more efficient, but it may also 
make investigators less accurate.  It is not clear from available 
information what, if any, steps are being taken to acknowledge and 
counteract these vulnerabilities for error.  Patternizr’s developers and 
departments using Patternizr or similar predictive policing tools 
should work to ensure accuracy in the data recording and input 
processes, rigorously question the underlying theories informing the 
creation of the model and implement protocols to combat the rush to 
judgement to which automation and confirmation biases contribute. 
iii. Patternizr and Fourth Amendment Issues 
Patternizr holds the potential to link new crime reports to cases 
with an identified suspect, allowing investigators to narrow in on a 
single suspect whose M.O. may match prior crime(s).143  This raises 
important questions of how potential pattern matches are being used 
in determinations of reasonable suspicion and probable cause.  For 
example, if an investigator “patternizes” a burglary and Patternizer 
suggests that it matches a closed case to which the suspect pleaded 
guilty, the investigator now has a name and address for a top suspect.  
A critical and unanswered question is: Can the investigator use this 
tip from Patternizr to articulate probable cause?  While there may be 
a temptation to use a Patternizr recommendation as justification for a 
search warrant, Patternizr should not be used as an independent 
factor in probable cause determinations. 
A Patternizr score is only as strong as the underlying data giving 
rise to the recommendation. If an investigator relies upon the 
underlying data alone (surfaced by Patternizr), and not the Patternizr 
score, the probable cause analysis will be the same as if the pattern 
had been manually identified by an analyst.144  However, the Fourth 
Amendment analysis is weakened and made more difficult for judges 
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to review if the investigator is permitted to use the Patternizr 
recommendation itself as part of the probable cause determination.  
The data informing the recommendation is made up of police reports, 
and the evidence in the reports and any additional officer 
corroboration should be enough to form the basis for probable cause 
without a Patternizr recommendation.145  The fact that a computer 
algorithm suggests two crimes might be linked should not be 
considered evidence in its own right. 
For the same reason, a Patternizr recommendation or score should 
not count towards the totality of the circumstances giving rise to 
probable cause.  Counting it towards the totality of the circumstances 
risks double-counting factors already taken into account by the 
algorithm.  For example, if the investigator in the hypodermic needle-
wielding shoplifter case cited the similarities between the crimes (the 
underlying data) and the high Patternizr score as reasons for granting 
a warrant, the inclusion of the Patternizr score in the analysis would 
be inappropriate double-counting.146  While there is no reporting to 
suggest that Patternizr scores and recommendations are being used in 
probable cause determinations, attorneys should remain vigilant to 
the potential expanded use of Patternizr in probable cause and 
reasonable suspicion determinations. 
III. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ADVOCATES AND POLICYMAKERS 
Advocates and policymakers face important questions regarding 
the use of predictive policing technologies.  A first critical question is 
whether such technologies should be used at all.  While some 
commentators believe predictive policing is inevitable and should be 
better managed, many activists and advocacy organizations have 
urged lawmakers to ban predictive policing technologies altogether.147  
This debate over the use of predictive policing largely occurs outside 
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of the realm of police decision-making, however, as police policies are 
seldom subjected to the same level of democratic review as those of 
other government agencies.148  As such, a good starting place would 
be to ensure a robust public debate and democratic oversight over 
whether, and how, these tools are used.149  The following considers 
two potential strategies for reform-minded advocates and policy-
makers to eliminate or reduce the potential harms of predictive 
policing tools like Patternizr, including an outright ban and steps 
towards better regulation of such tools. 
A. Considerations for Banning the Use of Predictive Policing Tools 
Such as Patternizr 
In the current context of policing in the United States, many 
advocates and activists warn against equipping law enforcement with 
any new predictive tools that may perpetuate racially-biased policing 
practices and which may erode Fourth Amendment protections.150  
The Movement for Black Lives policy agenda includes a goal of the 
“[t]otal prohibition on the acquisition of any new surveillance 
technology or development of surveillance program,” and a demand 
that “[f]ederal and local agencies should prevent the use of predictive 
systems that erode the Fourth Amendment.”151  The ACLU and a 
coalition of sixteen civil rights organizations, including the Leadership 
Conference on Civil and Human Rights, 18 Million Rising, the 
Brennan Center for Justice, the NAACP, Data & Society Research 
Institute, and the Electronic Frontier Foundation, caution that: 
The institution of American policing, into which these systems are 
being introduced, is profoundly flawed: it is systemically biased 
against communities of color and allows unconscionable abuses of 
police power.  Predictive policing tools threaten to provide a 
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misleading and undeserved imprimatur of impartiality for an 
institution that desperately needs fundamental change.  Systems that 
are engineered to support the status quo have no place in American 
policing.152 
Campaign Zero, a campaign to end police violence in America, 
lists ending the use of predictive policing technology among its 
recommended policy solutions for ending broken windows policing.153  
Campaign Zero explains that predictive policing technology “uses 
systematically biased data to enhance police profiling of Black people 
and communities.”154 
While NYPD leadership claims that Patternizr is immune from the 
issues that plague earlier versions of predictive policing 
technologies,155 this Article argues that Patternizr is likely to further 
exacerbate racial biases that are entrenched within policing and the 
criminal legal system at large.156  This Article has also investigated the 
potential of cognitive biases, such as automation bias and 
confirmation bias, that are likely to further exacerbate problems 
caused by racially-biased data, in addition to raising unanswered 
questions concerning Fourth Amendment protections and the use of 
Patternizr.157  Patternizr should not be immune from the criticisms of 
other predictive policing technologies, nor should advocates and 
policymakers take the NYPD’s word that it is bias-free without a 
rigorous independent review. 
Given what is known about Patternizr and the troubling findings 
on the impacts of other predictive policing tools built on similarly 
racially biased data, policymakers and advocates who seek to ban 
Patternizr and other predictive policing technologies are not taking a 
radical position.  Nearly every leading advocacy organization in the 
field of police accountability has either issued a dire warning against 
the use of predictive policing technologies158 or gone further to adopt 
the ban of predictive policing technologies as part of their policy 
platform.159  Advocates and police-reform-aligned policymakers at 
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the local and state level can and should push for the halt of the use of 
predictive policing technologies by law enforcement. 
B. Regulating the Use of Patternizr to Minimize Harm 
Alternatively, advocates and policymakers may seek to take a 
more pragmatic approach to regulating the use of predictive policing 
technologies including Patternizr.  This Section outlines several steps 
that policymakers and advocates can take to minimize the potential 
harm of predictive policing tools like Patternizr. 
i. Ensure Democratic Accountability and Transparency 
As policing tools and surveillance tactics become more advanced, 
democratic oversight is critical to ensure that civil rights and liberties 
are adequately protected.160  In order to have true democratic 
accountability over the tools and tactics used by our police forces, we 
must first have transparency.161  The NYPD should open up its 
database and use of Patternizr to an independent audit to determine 
whether the algorithm risks perpetuating racial disparities within the 
criminal legal system.162  Policymakers in local and state government 
can facilitate such an audit by requiring the NYPD to stop using 
Patternizr and any other predictive policing technologies until an 
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independent audit has been conducted.  After a thorough, 
independent audit, policymakers should require a public presentation 
of the findings.  A robust and informed public discussion should then 
precede a vote by a democratically accountable assembly, such as the 
City Council.163  Such democratic safeguards are critical for the 
legitimacy of law enforcement and ensuring that modern policing 
techniques do not overstep Constitutional limitations.164 
ii. Require Disclosure of Predictive Policing Tools in Criminal Cases 
In addition to calling for more transparency and oversight 
regarding the use of predictive policing tools by the NYPD and other 
police departments, advocates — especially criminal defense 
attorneys — should push for requirements that prosecutors disclose 
the use of predictive policing tools and decision support models in 
arriving at the arrest and prosecution of individual defendants.  The 
same problems identified in Section I.B.i, including racial, 
automation, and confirmation biases may compromise investigations, 
reveal a lack of probable cause, and could possibly exculpate 
individual defendants.  Criminal defense attorneys, judges, and juries 
should have this information in order to better evaluate the 
government’s case against the defendant and to more fully interrogate 
the process leading to the arrest and prosecution. 
Absent proactive disclosure from the prosecution, criminal defense 
attorneys have no way of knowing whether a predictive policing tool 
like Patternizr helped to identify their client. Defense attorneys in 
jurisdictions using Patternizr165 should be alert to the potential use of 
Patternizr in their cases involving charges of robbery, burglary, or 
grand larceny — the crimes for which the NYPD is currently using 
Patternizr166 — where the defendant is charged with two or more 
similar crimes, or where their current charge is similar to a past crime 
for which they were charged.167  Defense attorneys should be 
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especially alert to the potential use of Patternizr in situations where 
their clients are accused of committing crimes across precinct and 
police command jurisdictions, as it is unlikely that the NYPD would 
have recognized such a pattern without the use of Patternizr.168 
In cases where defense attorneys suspect predictive policing tools 
were used to identify their client, they may be able to argue that the 
prosecution has a constitutional obligation to disclose whether a 
predictive algorithm was used as well as any reports generated by the 
tool.169 Under Brady v. Maryland, the government is required to 
disclose all material, exculpatory evidence in advance of trial to the 
defense.170  However, this argument will not succeed without showing 
a “reasonable probability” that the disclosure of the use of predictive 
policing tools will affect the outcome of the trial.171  This is a tall 
order in the context of predictive policing, where the algorithm is an 
investigative tool — albeit, a tool with flaws that could lead to 
wrongful convictions172 — and, in most contexts, not actual evidence 
in its own right.173  As a result, it may be challenging for a defense 
attorney to show that the disclosure of the use of predictive policing 
tools would have been exculpatory and material enough to affect the 
outcome of a case.174 
In the context of Patternizr, however, defense attorneys can argue 
that a Patternizr report with other potential crime patterns and 
alternative suspects should be considered Brady material. Prosecutors 
have an obligation to disclose evidence that suggests someone other 
than the accused committed the crime.175  Defense attorneys can 
argue that a high Patternizr probability score for a crime committed 
by another person must be disclosed.176  A failure to investigate other 
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suspects from a list of potential crime patterns raises questions about 
the validity of the investigation, and therefore should be made 
available to the defense as impeachment material against 
investigating officers. 
In jurisdictions with discovery laws that are more expansive than 
constitutional requirements,177 statutory arguments may prove more 
fruitful in obtaining disclosure of the use of predictive policing tools 
under provisions calling for the disclosure of police reports and notes 
related to the case. 
New York State recently passed a law reforming its discovery 
practices, which will go into effect on January 1, 2020.178  The new law 
— N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 245 — replaces New York’s current 
discovery statute, called the “blindfold” law because it “keep[s] 
people accused of crimes completely in the dark about critical 
evidence against them,” allowing prosecutors to withhold evidence 
until the day of trial.179  The new law requires prosecutors to share 
discoverable materials with the defense within fifteen calendar days 
of the defendant’s arraignment.180  In addition to drastically 
reforming the timeframe in which evidence must be disclosed, § 245 
also enumerates a non-exhaustive list of automatically discoverable 
materials — materials that the prosecution is required to disclose 
even if not specifically requested by the defense.181  These materials 
include evidence such as statements by the defendant and co-
defendants to law enforcement, grand jury testimony, names and 
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contact information for witnesses, police reports, notes taken by 
police and other investigators, and law enforcement agency reports.182 
Section 245’s enumeration of automatically discoverable materials 
offers promising avenues for defenders to obtain information on the 
NYPD’s use of predictive policing tools like Patternizr in individual 
cases.183  Under subsection (e), the government must automatically 
disclose “all police reports, notes of police and other investigators, 
and law enforcement agency reports.”184 When a crime analyst or 
officer enters a crime into their system and selects to “patternize” the 
crime,185 the output of the Patternizr process — a list of potential 
crime patterns and scores — should be interpreted to be a law 
enforcement report, falling under the plain language of subsection 
(e), and as such, subject to automatic disclosure.186  While these 
reports should be automatically disclosed, it is likely that the NYPD 
and prosecutors will argue for a narrow interpretation of the new law, 
and as such, defense attorneys will need to push for disclosure of 
Patternizr reports.  When the new law takes effect, defense attorneys 
should request Patternizr reports in all property crime cases, arguing 
that they fall under § 245.20(1)(e). 
iii. Implement Training and Procedures to Reduce the Impact of 
Cognitive Biases 
Cognitive biases, including automation bias and confirmation bias, 
may be ingrained in the human brain and, as a result, may be 
impossible to completely overcome and challenging to reduce.187  
Police departments and the creators of predictive policing 
technologies such as Patternizr would benefit from engaging with 
experts on cognitive biases188 to better understand the impacts of such 
biases and specific methods to reduce the harms of cognitive biases 
when developing and implementing predictive technologies.  The 
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NYPD could, for example, work with an outside expert to consult on 
the impact of cognitive biases on the use of Patternizr and the risk of 
unchecked error that such biases exacerbate.  Such experts may be 
able to tailor specific recommendations in terms of training and 
procedures to avoid making bias-influenced errors. 
Existing literature on the impacts of cognitive biases on policing 
suggest two main ways of reducing the impact of automation and 
confirmation biases on the use of predictive policing tools.189  These 
suggestions include providing law enforcement with training on the 
limits and problems of predictive tools as well as requiring procedures 
to disrupt the influence of biases and rigorously test hypotheses.190 
In his recommendations for responding to issues arising from 
problems with flawed data, Professor Ferguson advocates for 
predictive policing systems to acknowledge error as a contrast to the 
conventional assumption that algorithms cannot be biased or 
incorrect.191 Ferguson argues that, by acknowledging room for error, 
police departments will be more likely to audit for errors and better 
able to correct errors by training the staff who use the algorithms to 
prevent the errors to which the algorithm may be susceptible.192  
Additionally, training on the limitations of predictive policing tools 
like Patternizr may empower officers using the decision-support 
system to more critically evaluate the recommendations made by the 
system, helping to reduce the impact of automation bias.193 
In addition to training, protocols that create opportunities to 
question hypotheses and disrupt confirmation bias may help reduce 
the combined impact of automation bias and confirmation bias in the 
context of predictive policing tools like Patternizr.  Behavioral 
economists suggest mental exercises to overcome biased thinking 
including making at least three different estimates (for example, 
asking oneself who are three possible suspects, or what are three 
possible M.O.s for this crime), using “premortems” where the task 
requires “imagin[ing] a future failure and then explain[ing] the 
cause,” attempting to evaluate the hypothesis as an “outsider” to the 
work, seeking outside advice or review from others, contemplating 
other options that perhaps have not been fully considered, and 
challenging motivated biases by establishing “trip wires” (i.e., setting 
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a date by which an investigation must be sufficient to move along or 
the investigation must be abandoned).194 
Amaury Murgado, a retired special operations lieutenant with a 
Florida Sheriff’s Office, applies similar suggestions to the law 
enforcement context in his article Dealing with Confirmation Bias 
published by Police Magazine.195  Murgado suggests that officers “try 
to disprove [their] theories instead of trying to prove them.”196  He 
cautions that gut instincts can be helpful in providing possible 
avenues for exploration by the officer, but that they should not be 
treated as conclusive.197  By summarizing D. Kim Rossmo’s Criminal 
Investigative Failures, Murgado provides a list of ten key techniques 
for officers to reduce confirmation bias, including recommendations 
ranging from trainings for officers on confirmation bias, encouraging 
a culture of impartiality, neutrality, and open inquiry, organizing 
brainstorming sessions where creativity is sought and early consensus 
or groupthink is avoided, asking “how do we know what we think we 
know” throughout the investigative process, and seeking out expert 
opinions when appropriate.198 
In an effort to reduce the impact of automation bias and 
confirmation bias on the use of Patternizr, the NYPD should 
implement trainings to ensure that officers understand how these 
common biases may lead to incorrect — and, in the context of the 
criminal legal system, terribly unjust — results.  Further, the NYPD 
should implement procedures for the use of Patternizr, that integrate 
the above-discussed methods, such as requiring officers to write down 
the reason for deciding that a series of crimes is a pattern, what other 
options existed (other crimes, other suspects, deciding that there was 
no match, etc.), and why they did not select those other options. 
Additionally, the NYPD could require regular check-ins with 
supervisors or peers where analysts and officers’ hypotheses are 
challenged and alternatives are seriously considered. Such trainings 
and procedures are unlikely to fully eliminate the impact of cognitive 
biases on the use of Patternizr and other predictive policing tools, but 
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they may help to reduce the chances of unchecked biases leading to 
wrongful arrests, prosecutions, and convictions. 
iv. Acknowledge and Address Racial Disparities in Underlying Crime 
Data 
In addition to providing trainings and procedures to reduce the 
impact of cognitive biases, police departments using Patternizr and 
other predictive policing tools must take steps to eliminate the racial 
biases of the underlying data from which predictive tools are built.  
The first step is to acknowledge — and to be transparent — about the 
racial biases embedded in the algorithm’s source data.  Publicly 
available NYPD crime data shows that Black and Latinx people are 
vastly overrepresented in the suspect and arrest pool for crime 
overall, including property crimes.199  Based on available information, 
Patternizr was likely trained on racially biased data that oversamples 
crimes where people of color have been identified as suspects.200 
Researchers and criminal justice stakeholders from a range of 
perspectives agree that people of color are overrepresented in arrests 
for low-level offenses due to the aggressive broken windows policing 
in neighborhoods of color.201  However, there is less research as to 
why racial disparities exist in victim-reported crimes, including 
property crimes.  A report by the Sentencing Project grapples with 
this question, suggesting that, “[t]he disproportionate rate of [B]lack 
crime should not be surprising given that African Americans are far 
more likely than whites to experience and to live in communities with 
concentrated disadvantage.”202  The report goes on to suggest that 
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“the criminal justice system does not simply mirror these differences 
in crime rates — it exacerbates them through codified policies and 
individual discretion.”203 
Individual discretion in the reporting and response to property 
crimes may at least partially explain racial disparities in property 
crime data.204  For example, people of color may be more likely to be 
reported for shoplifting offenses because of a heightened suspicion of 
shoplifting by store employees and security.205  While many 
shoplifting offenses are charged as petit larceny,206 shoplifting 
offenses can rise to the level of a grand larceny charge if the items 
taken are valued at $1000 or more.207  Additionally, some New York 
City retailers have a practice of presenting low-level shoplifters with a 
trespass notice, alerting them that they are not welcome to return to 
the store, after which even low-dollar shoplifting can lead to felony 
burglary charges.208  In this example, the racial biases of store 
employees lead to increased surveillance of Black customers and 
subsequent disproportionate reporting of Black suspects of 
shoplifting offenses.209  As a result, the racial bias of private actors 
impacts the reporting of crime and therefore contributes to the 
overrepresentation of people of color in both the data used to train 
Patternizr and the suspect pool of potential crime patterns to which 
Patternizr suggests matches. 
These racial biases that are built into algorithms cannot easily be 
undone.  Unlike training users of Patternizr on automation and 
confirmation biases so that they can more critically engage with 
Patternizr’s recommendations, Patternizr’s racial bias problem starts 
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with its source data.210  No amount of implicit bias trainings for 
officers or crime analysts can solve the problem of vast racial 
disparities in the very data from which the algorithm was built.  The 
only way to solve the problem of racial bias in the data predictive 
policing tools use is to eliminate racial biases from policing as a 
whole.  Without first addressing racial biases in policing as a whole, 
tools that make police more efficient will, at best, make police more 
efficient at the status quo of biased policing, and at worst, compound 
racial biases in the criminal legal system.211 
CONCLUSION 
The NYPD has developed a new and potentially powerful 
predictive tool that will help investigators more efficiently identify 
crime patterns.  Whether the tool is “fair,” as its developers claim, is 
yet to be determined — though unlikely from the information that is 
available.  Advocates for over-policed communities and those accused 
of crimes have reason to be concerned and to remain vigilant.  Prior 
generations of predictive policing and actuarial justice tools — 
including algorithms that do not include race in their design — 
produce racially-disparate results that intensify policing of already 
over-policed communities.  It is likely that Patternizr will produce 
similar results due to the over-representation of people of color 
presently in NYPD databases.  The combination of racial, 
automation, and confirmation biases may produce particularly 
devastating results for individuals who appear in Patternizr’s 
recommendations.  Advocates and policymakers should act quickly to 
address the issues arising from Patternizr and other predictive 
policing tools.  While waiting for policymakers to act to limit its 
harms, the city’s criminal defense attorneys will need to serve as a 
bulwark against the potential misuse of Patternizr.  In a justice system 
that relies on quick plea deals, defense attorneys will need to do their 
due diligence to ensure that officers and prosecutors are not relying 
on computerized matches and scant evidence when charging new 
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